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Main Sources of Ammonia on ISS
Crew
• Approximately 53% metabolic load
• Product of protein metabolism
• Limit production of ammonia by external regulation NOT possbile
Payloads
• Potential source
• Scientific experiments
• Thorough safety review ensures sufficient levels of containment
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Main Sources of Ammonia on ISS
• USOS Thermal Control System
• Provides thermal control to USOS (include Columbus and JEM)
• Comprised of Internal and External systems
• Internal Active Thermal Control System (IATCS)
 uses single-phase H2O to remove internal heat
 system pressure ~190 kPa (~28psi)
 MDP ~690kPa (~100psi)
• External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS)
 uses liquid NH3 as refrigerant
 system pressure ~2000kPa (~300psi)
 MDP ~3500kPa (~500psi)
 At assembly complete, two, independent NH3 loops
 Per loop:  272kg (600lbs) / 394L (104 gallons) / 1.7°-3.9°C (35°-39°F)
• Heat transfer from IATCS and EATCS occurs at ammonia-to-water interface 
heat exchanger (IFHX) externally mounted
Systems
Page No. 4
INTERNATIONALSPACE STATION
• Natural state is colorless, alkaline gas (RT and 1 atm)
• Pungent, very familiar odor (odor threshold ~ 1- 5 ppm)
• High H2O solubility (at 20°C, 34% w/w)
• Flammability limits in air, 15-28% (by volume)
• High vapor pressure 
 Anhydrous NH3 (20°C) ~ 8.5atm
 Aqueous NH3 (28%, 25 C) ~ 2.9atm
• Moderate base (pKa ~ 9.2); undergoes acid-base reactions forming H2O-soluble 
ammonium (NH4+) salts
• Normal combustion yields nitrogen (at 750°-900°C with Pt, NO and NO2 can form)
• Properties of liquid NH3 very similar to liquid H2O
 H-bonding, low density, low viscosity, and high permittivity
 widely used reaction medium
• Widely used in fertilizers, household cleaning products, commercial refrigeration, etc.
• Corrosive, can corrodes copper, brass, nickel, PVC, zinc, etc. 
Ammonia Chemistry
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Ammonia Exposure
• Principal toxic effect ammonia vapor - irritation to soft tissue (eyes, mucous 
membranes, respiratory tract)
 NH3 (NH4OH) reacts with soft tissue – alkali burns
 heat released when NH3 reacts with H2O in soft tissue
• Documented effects of ammonia vapor exposure
 Irritation to eyes and nasal passage begin as low at 100ppm (69mg/m3)
 Throat irritation at 400ppm (276mg/m3)
 Severe irritation to eyes, nose, and throat at 500ppm (345mg/m3)
 Laryngospasm at 1700ppm (1200mg/m3)
• Temporary systemic effect – metabolic acidosis – also documented
• Principal toxic effect liquid ammonia – caustic burns and freeze burns
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Ammonia Exposure Limits
• US Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations (SMAC)
 1-hour → 30ppm (20mg/m3)
 24-hour → 20ppm (14mg/m3)
 7-, 30-, 180-day → 10ppm (7mg/m3)
• RS Limiting Permissible Concentration (LPC)
 360-day → 1.4ppm (1mg/m3)
• National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Standards (NIOSH)
 recommended exposure limit, REL (10hrs TWA) → 25ppm (17mg/m3)
 short-term exposure limit, STEL (15min TWA) → 35ppm (24mg/m3) 
 immediate danger to life and health, IDLH → 300ppm (207mg/m3)
• Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
 permissible exposure limit for general industry, PEL (8hrs TWA) → 50ppm 
(35mg/m3)
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Ammonia Release into the ISS
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• Entry of NH3(l) inside cabin of ISS via IFHX
• ∆P between IATCS and EATCS forces NH3(l) into 
IATCS
• Most probably entry into cabin is through Gas Trap
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Ammonia Release Into ISS
• Entry of NH3 into habitable volume of ISS via IFHX breach
 If accumulator >90%, IFHX NH3 leak warning automatically issued and IFHX bypassed 
 Pressures and temperatures of EATCS checked to verify possible IFHX breach
• IFHX breach can occur in one of three possible ways:
1. Freezing water within IFHX core
 NH3 temperature falls below 0 C (32 F), working fluids of IATCS and EATCS stagnate,  
IFHX heater failure or ISS attitude
 Three levels of redundancy in NH3 temperature control and operational safeguards
2. Structural failure of IFHX core
 Inadequate strength of material, stress corrosion, materials compatibility, propogation of 
micro-cracks
 Selection of proper materials, manufacturing processes, and correct testing procedures
3. Over-pressurization of EATCS
 IFHX heater failure, flow of NH3 at heater is low-flow or no-flow, failure of pressure relief 
valves and bleedlines
 Modifications to IFHX plumbing and software control of the IFHX bypass and isolation 
valves
 Mutiple RPCs to power-off for each heater; sufficient capacity in accumulator from 
volumetric expansion from one heater failure, IFHX isolation relief valves
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Types of Ammonia Leaks Possible
 If IFHX breach occurs, three types of leaks are possible….
 Micro-leak
 Detected via samples from ITCS water – tested every 90-days
 Declared if ammonia concentration in water > 3 ppm
 Moderate-leak
 Detected by telemetry on ITCS accumulator quantity and ITCS water sample
 Declared if BOTH are true:
 Increase of ITCS accumulator quantity at least 1% over steady state values, not 
attributed to other causes
AND
 Ammonia concentration in ITCS water is greater than 6 ppm
 Rupture
 Detected by IFHX FDIR
OR
 In dual loop mode, LT accumulator quantity increases at least 50% over steady state 
values, not attributable to other causes
 Currently backed up from 30 ppm maximum measurement capability
OR
 Calculated lab pump outlet pressure is greater than 768 kPa, not attributable to other 
causes
OR
 Lab pump inlet pressure is greater than 401 kPa, not attributable to other causes
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In the Event of an Ammonia Release on 
ISS
• (1) Maintain crew safety and
• (2) Maintain ISS operations
• Current procedures isolate crew to ROS – Service Module – with PPE (PBA, 
ИПК-1M, ammonia respirators)
• Probability exists NH3 will contaminate Service Module
• Probability of maintaining crew safety and ISS operations is function of PPE 
capabilities, NH3 monitoring capabilities, and NH3 removal capabilities
• Options to increase this probability:
• Increase NH3 monitoring capability
• Increase NH3 removal capability
• Increase PPE capability
• Ideally, ALL THREE!
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Ammonia Monitoring Capability on ISS
• ИПД Kit (RS) – Draeger Tubes
 Type 0.25/a:  0.3-3ppm (0.2-2mg/m3)
 Type 0.25/a:  0.3-28ppm (0.2-20mg/m3)
• ГАНК-4M (RS)
 Electrochemical Sensor:  7-143ppm (5-100mg/m3)
 Tape Sensor:  0.7-143ppm (0.5-100mg/m3)
• Draeger CMS (RS) – Draeger Chip Measurement System
 Ammonia Chip:  0.2-2000ppm (0.1-1380mg/m3)
 Still undergoing on-orbit testing?  Certified?
• Extended-Range Ammonia Detection Kit  (US) – Draeger Tubes 
(located FGB)
 Low- range 2/a:  5-30ppm (3.5-21mg/m3)
 Mid-range 5/a:  30-700ppm (21-490mg/m3)
 High-range 0.5%/a:  500-10,000ppm (345-7000mg/m3)
existing
added
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Ammonia Removal Capability on ISS
 ROS Capability:
 BMP (in SM) 
 Effective removal flow is 0.58 x 27 m3/h = 15.7 m3/h
 Assumes 58% efficiency under normal regeneration cycling.
 FVP (in FGB) [limited NH3 capacity = 0 to 133 grams]
 Effective removal flow is 1.0 x 20 m3/h = 20 m3/h
 SKV (in SM) 
 Efficiency varies depending upon the latent load removed and the air 
flow through the heat exchanger core. For the SKV 50% bypass:
 For 2 person latent load efficiency = 24% 
 For 3 person latent load efficiency = 32%
 For 2 people removal flow rate = 0.239 x 144 m3/h = 34.4 m3/h 
 For 3 people removal flow rate = 46.2  m3/h
 USOS Capability:
 TCCS (in Lab) [limited NH3 capacity = 0 to 100 grams]
 Effective removal flow up to saturation is = 15.3 m3/h
 CCAA (in Lab and A/L) – due to inactive ITCS assumed unusable
 For 50% bypass: 
 For 2-person latent load efficiency = 12% 
 For 3-person latent load efficiency = 17% 
existing
Additional ammonia removal capability has not been implemented. 
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Personal Protection Equipment on ISS
• ИПКs (ROS)
 70 minutes O2
 Use in ammonia release needs to be verified
• PBAs (USOS)
 10 minutes O2
 Positive-pressure minimizes chance of 
ammonia entering side of mask
• Ammonia Respirator Kit
 Small, medium, or large hooded respirators
 6 pairs of ammonia-specific cartridges
 Maintains moisture in air to maintain scrubbing 
capability of SKV
 Certified to 1200ppm NH3
 Stored in FGB
existing
added
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Ammonia Release on ISS
 Probability of maintaining crew safety and ISS operations is function of 
PPE capabilities, NH3 monitoring capabilities, and NH3 removal 
capabilities
 Options to increase this probability:
 Increase NH3 monitoring capability
 Extended Range Ammonia Detection Kit
 Monitoring up to 10,000ppm NH3
 Increase NH3 removal capability
 Best removal means – humidity condensate
 Hooded respirators maintains scrubbing capability via humidity condensate
 Additional hardware not possible in reasonable timeframe
 Increase PPE capability – hooded, 3M respirators
 Provides time for scrubbing
 Allows humidity condensate removal
 Key objectives met 
o Good Fit – Ensuring clean air
o Keeping the A/C system wet
o Comfort – need to wear for a number of hours no matter what extra 
removal capability have 
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Existing Capability Supports 171 ppm
Scrubbing of ROS with FVP, SKV, BMP; 3-person latent load
0
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
1750
2000
2250
2500
0 60 120 180 240 300 360 420 480 540 600
Time after incident occurs (minutes)
A
m
m
on
ia
 C
on
ce
nt
ra
tio
n 
(p
pm
)
Proposed Capability
Maximum Initial NH3 Concentration: 2048 ppm.  Don 
Proposed Capability
Cabin NH3 Concentration: 1200 ppm @ t=70 minutes. Don Respirator.
100 ppm Minimum Doffing Criteria
30 ppm 1-hr 
Current Capability
Maximum Initial NH3 Concentration:  170 ppm.  Don PBA.
Cabin NH3 Concentration: 100 ppm @ t=397 minutes
Minimum NH3 Concentration to Doff Respirator
Cabin NH3 Concentration: 31ppm @ t=550 minutes
Added Capability of Respirator (8-hr time limit)
Page No. 16
INTERNATIONALSPACE STATION
Team Members
Buddy Brown (CB)
A.G. Ghariani (EC)
John Graf (EC)
John James (SF)
Sharon Johnson (Boeing)
Phil Lamczyk (ECLSS MOD)
Devanshi Patel (Safety - NE)
Jay Perry (MSFC – ECLSS – EI12)
Karon Woods (Safety – NE)
Doug Tran (Safety – NE)
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Backup Charts
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Ammonia Release into ISS
 Cabin conditions rapidly deteriorate after an IFHX breach.
 The time to effect for “pin-hole” sized breach of the HX (0.05” dia) is 
measured in minutes
 Time to gas trap breach:  10.75 minutes
 Time to 700 ppm:  10.9 minutes
 Time to 2000 ppm:  11.18 minutes
 Time to 16%:  37.32 minutes
 The time to effect for “gross” breach of the HX (0.5” dia) is measured in 
seconds.
 Time to gas trap breach:  10.6 seconds
 Time to 700 ppm:  10.6 seconds
 Time to 2000 ppm:  10.8 seconds
 Time to 16%:  31.3 seconds
 This analysis does not address detailed failure mechanisms, or the 
likelihood of system failures.  This analysis parametrically addresses the 
time to effect as a function of the equivalent area of the HX breach.
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Ammonia Release into ISS
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0.0103 0.05 38 645 0.031 0.0787 654 14.41 671 14.43 779 14.54 1172 4.32% 2239 15.05 n/a
0.051 0.1 38 190 0.125 0.157 191.75 14.41 196 14.43 220.25 14.54 313 4.34% 588.75 16.27 1342
0.203 0.2 9 47.5 0.503 0.315 48 14.41 49 14.43 55 14.54 79 4.38% 150.25 16.91 278
0.456 0.3 5.3 21.5 0.95 0.433 21.5 14.41 22 14.42 25 14.54 36.25 4.37% 69.25 17.01 127
0.811 0.4 3.5 16.4 1.544 0.552 16.4 14.4 16.7 14.42 18.2 14.53 24.7 4.40% 44.8 17.06 87
1.267 0.5 3 10.6 2.268 0.669 10.6 14.4 10.8 14.41 12 14.54 16.6 4.33% 31.3 17.08 59
0.0103 0.05 38 645 0.031 0.0787 660 14.41 689 14.43 861 14.54 1449 4.32% 2959 15.05 n/a
0.051 0.1 38 190 0.125 0.157 193.25 14.41 199.75 14.43 239.5 14.54 380.75 4.32% 778 16.34 n/a
0.203 0.2 9 47.5 0.503 0.315 48.25 14.41 50 14.43 60 14.54 96.5 4.32% 198.25 16.94 n/a
0.456 0.3 5.3 21.5 0.95 0.433 21.75 14.41 22.25 14.42 27.75 14.54 44.5 4.43% 92 17.04 n/a
0.811 0.4 3.5 16.4 1.544 0.552 16.5 14.41 16.9 14.42 19.6 14.54 29.5 4.41% 59.1 17.07 n/a
1.267 0.5 3 10.6 2.268 0.669 10.7 14.41 11.1 14.42 12.9 14.54 20.2 4.43% 41.8 17.09 86
Assembly Complete (636 m^3)
Time=0 when HX breaches
Current Config (383 m^3)
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Micro-leak Scenario
 Micro-leak occurs
 Ammonia starts to mix with water in ITCS loop and 
ammonia concentration in water starts to rise. 
 No noticeable accumulator increase. 
 Diffusion into cabin through Teflon flex hoses and gas trap
 For LTL IFHX leak, 22% diffusion occurs through gas trap, 78% through flex 
hoses
 For MTL IFHX leak, 11% diffusion occurs through gas trap, 89% through flex 
hoses
 Concentration in cabin will equilibrate with concentration in 
the water loop. 
 Condensing heat exchangers and TCCS systems will be 
able to keep up with diffusion for a micro-leak
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Micro-Leak Response
 No PPE is needed 
 No USOS evacuation is needed. 
 Gas traps will be removed to minimize diffusion and protect 
gas traps
 May be re-evaluated
 If in single loop, system may be configured to dual loop 
mode
 Will help to identify which loop the leak is in. 
 EVA task to isolate and vent the Ammonia side of the 
leaking IFHX will be performed as soon as possible.  
 HX will be R&Red but may not be connected until ITCS 
contamination has been dealt with.
 No guarantee on how long this will remain a micro-leak 
based on the great pressure differences between the 
different sides of the HX. 
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Moderate Leak Scenario
 Micro-leak develops to moderate leak or moderate leak occurs. 
 Ammonia mixes with water in ITCS loop and ammonia 
concentration in the water rises. 
 Noticeable accumulator increase (~1%) over steady state values. 
 Diffusion into cabin through Teflon flex hoses and gas trap
 For LTL IFHX leak, 22% diffusion occurs through gas trap, 78% through flex 
hoses
 For MTL IFHX leak, 11% diffusion occurs through gas trap, 89% through flex 
hoses
 Concentration in cabin will equilibrate with concentration in the 
water loop. 
 Greatest level can measure in water is 6 ppm, but the 1% accumulator 
increase would equate to much larger concentration in the water. 
 Crew should be able to notice smell at these levels, but if the rate of 
increase is slow they may not. 
 Condensing heat exchangers and TCCS systems may or may not 
be able to keep up with diffusion, depends on the size of the 
moderate leak. 
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Moderate Leak Response
 PPE may be needed if crew is experiencing irritation
 Filtering masks may be used, if available. Current half masks do not provide protection from 
eye irritation. 
 No USOS evacuation is needed as long as levels stay below: still under evaluation
 Russian limit = 7 ppm for 15 days 
 180 day SMAC limit is approximately 10 ppm
 Gas traps may or may not be removed 
 Criteria still under evaluation 
 If in single loop, system will be configured to dual loop mode
 Will help to identify which loop the leak is in. 
 If time allows and leak is in MTL IFHX, a number of racks will be jumpered in 
preparation for loss of MTL. 
 If system is in dual loop mode and the leaking IFHX has been identified, 
system may be reconfigured to single loop  
 Provides greater volume and delay hazardous conditions from being reached sooner. 
 EVA task to isolate and vent the Ammonia side of the leaking IFHX will be 
performed as soon as possible.  
 HX will be R&Red but may not be connected until ITCS contamination has been dealt with.
 No guarantee on how long this will remain a moderate leak based on the 
great pressure differences between the different sides of the HX. 
 At any time if accumulator qty or Draeger measurement indicates ammonia 
concentration greater than 30 ppm, leak will be elevated to a rupture. 
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Rupture Scenario
 Rupture happens
 Three layers of freeze protection have failed, or there has been 
micrometeoroid hit that damages internal but not external side of HX, or has 
been internal corrosion induced failure. 
 Accumulator quantity will increase quickly to max out position on 
ITCS accumulator. 
 Only takes 3.5 lbs of ammonia given accumulator initial quantity ~75%  
 Pressure in ITCS loop will increase until a breach is caused. 
 Lowest burst pressure is gas traps at 212-300 psia
 ITCS will leak water with 4.4% ammonia by weight into the cabin
 Calculated for an LTL leak
 Concentration in cabin locally (USOS) will rise quickly based on the 
amount leaked in. 
 For 2.2 lbs, in the USOS 262 ppm ammonia
 For 22 lbs, in the USOS 2500 ppm ammonia
 If FDIR annunciated warning, crew will push ATM button isolating 
IMV and preventing the diffusion to the RS. 
 SCRs in the system to elevate the warning to an emergency and automatically 
tie response to the emergency trigger. 
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Rupture Response
 Crew hears alarm for ITCS warning or smells ammonia
 Crew dons PBA, pushes ATM button, and evacuates & isolates 
USOS.
 Once in RS uses ammonia Draeger tubes to determine ammonia 
concentration in RS. 
 Plan to use IVA Ammonia Detection Kit 
 Currently can use Russian Draeger tubes – measure only up to 30 ppm
 As a back-up could look at GANK reading (measures up to ~ 142 ppm)
 Not validated for on-orbit decisions
 Crew transfers to Russian gas mask if needed. 
 If not doffs masks 
 USOS PPRVs will crack with increasing pressures, USOS volume 
will need to be vented to eliminate as much ammonia vapor as 
possible.   
 CCAAs could continue to be run to collect water and eliminate ammonia as 
long as LTL is still operable (would mean leak was in MTL) 
 Crew/ground determines if RS hardware will be able to clean RS to 
acceptable levels in PPE time remaining. 
 If not, evacuate.  
 Currently this limit is an initial concentration of 171 ppm in RS. 
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Increasing Ammonia Removal 
Capability on ISS – Options Reviewed
 COTS industrial unit to remove NH3
 Pros: Proven applied technology designed for specific application. 
 Cons: Too large for ISS application and don’t operate at  28 or 120Vdc. 
 Find material to put in LiOH can to use in Russian CO2 absorber unit 
 Pros: Utilizes existing interfaces and hardware on-orbit.  Applicable to RS and can be used with PFA 
for USOS application. 
 Cons: Limited capability based on sizing of existing interfaces. 
 Increase latent loading  - by some aspirator
 Pros: Speeds up removal rates. 
 Cons: Need to design something for ISS and certify for use in RS. No practical application available.  
 Purge 
 Pros: Decreases concentration faster
 Cons: Not enough make-up air in RS to consider partial vent. No knowledge of compatibility of RS 
valve seals and with high concentrations of NH3. 
 Use CFU to entrain air with water
 Pros: All hardware exists on-orbit. 
 Cons: Not yet able to quantify the removal rate, need more time to look into.
 Use acid treated charcoal in the HEPA filters on USOS
 Pros: Good to absorb ammonia given no CCAA condensation. Not sure airflow on Russian Segment 
high enough to implement there. 
 Cons: Not sure of effectiveness due to flowrate limitations, very large to stow on-orbit. 
Page No. 27
INTERNATIONALSPACE STATION
Increasing PPE on ISS – Options Reviewed
 Increase number of PBAs on-orbit
 Pros: We own this hardware. 
 Cons: PBAs are ineffective for this application; they don’t last long enough to provide meaningful help. Designed for 
evacuation. No units available for this application.  
 Increase number of Russian gas masks on-orbit
 Pros: PPE use time is long 20-140 min. compared to PBAs. Sealed system, safe to use at all concentrations.  
 Cons: Crew may reach limits of being on O2.  Not putting latent load into the atmosphere to assist in removal. Still 
relatively short use time compared of that needed to restore the atmosphere.  Large, hot, and uncomfortable to wear for 
a long time.  Need to buy these from the Russians. 
 Fly 3M filtering respirators with NH3 removal cartridges
 Pros: Not increasing ppO2 or total P of ISS over long time; Putting latent load back into cabin helping humidity 
condensate removal of NH3; Other cartridges Russians fly fit this mask and solve other issue of not being able to use 
US provided goggles with ½ masks already on-orbit for toxic/post fire events. No additional chemical qualification 
needed. Can use NIOSH qual data since using in the same application. 
 PPE time @ 500 ppm is 211 min for 60 L/min.
 PPE time @ 500 ppm is 494 min. for 30 L/min. 
 Cons: New hardware to obtain and certify. Is a respirator and not a positive pressure device; poor fit causes leakage. 
 Investigate flying other re-breather
 Pros: Long PPE use time compared to PBAs. Sealed system, safe to use at all concentrations.  
 Cons: Crew may reach limits of being on O2.  Not putting latent load into the atmosphere to assist in removal. New 
hardware to obtain and certify. 
 Adapt Hooded Respirator
 Pros: Eliminates fit problems with glasses and facial hair.  Small to stow. Cartridge gives 54% additional capacity than 
3M mask.  
 Cons: One time use, hot, no purge capability, issues if ammonia is on hair, need to recertify with new media. 
